Which is an accurate way that the president can influence the federal bureaucracy?
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Abstract In the past 15 years a scholarly debate has developed in the United States over the question "Who controls the bureaucracy?" Some have argued that Congress has a dominant influence on the bureaucracy, some that the president plays the major role in managing the bureaucracy, and others have emphasized the role of legal constraints on the bureaucracy, as enforced by the courts. Still others have asserted that the bureaucracy has a substantial amount of autonomy from the president, Congress, and courts. This article presents a formal model of multi-institutional policy-making that illuminates several key aspects of this debate. The model shows that there are conditions under which an agency will have considerable autonomy and conditions under which it will have virtually none. The model also shows that when an agency lacks autonomy, control of the agency usually cannot be attributed to just one institution. Finally, the model has some important implications for empirical tests of hypotheses about who controls the bureaucracy; among them is the fact that the empirical literature on control of the bureaucracy is based on a logic that gives a seriously incomplete picture of how the bureaucracy is controlled and who controls it. Show Journal Information The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization is an interdisciplinary exercise. It seeks to promote an understanding of many complex phenomena by examining such matters from a combined law, economics, and organization perspective (or a two-way combination thereof). In this connection, we use the term organization broadly - to include scholarship drawing on political science, psychology and sociology, among other fields. It also holds the study of institutions - especially economic, legal, and political institutions - to be specifically important and greatly in need of careful analytic study. Publisher Information Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. OUP is the world's largest university press with the widest global presence. It currently publishes more than 6,000 new publications a year, has offices in around fifty countries, and employs more than 5,500 people worldwide. It has become familiar to millions through a diverse publishing program that includes scholarly works in all academic disciplines, bibles, music, school and college textbooks, business books, dictionaries and reference books, and academic journals. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. Read Online (Free) relies on page scans, which are not currently available to screen readers. To access this article, please contact JSTOR User Support . We'll provide a PDF copy for your screen reader. With a personal account, you can read up to 100 articles each month for free. Get StartedAlready have an account? Log in Monthly Plan
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Log in through your institution journal article The Dynamics of Political Control of the BureaucracyThe American Political Science Review Vol. 85, No. 3 (Sep., 1991) , pp. 801-828 (28 pages) Published By: American Political Science Association https://doi.org/10.2307/1963851 https://www.jstor.org/stable/1963851 Read and download Log in through your school or library Alternate access options For independent researchers Read Online Read 100 articles/month free Subscribe to JPASS Unlimited reading + 10 downloads Abstract A new paradigm of political-bureaucratic relations emerged through the 1980s holding that U.S. democratic institutions continuously shape nonelective public bureaucracies. Several empirical studies support the paradigm with evidence suggestive of political manipulation but none reveals the scope or specific mechanisms of political control. We explore the dynamics of political control of the bureaucracy explicitly to determine the scope and mechanisms. We examine output time series from seven different public bureaucracies for responsiveness to political tools applied in the late Carter and early Reagan administrations. We find responsiveness in all seven cases. The evidence also shows that political appointments--a shared power of the president and Congress--is the most important instrument of political control; changing budgets, legislation, congressional signals, and administrative reorganizations are less important. These findings confirm intuitive assertions by institutional scholars and suggest a method of @'policy monitoring@' that could enhance future democratic control of the bureaucracy. Journal Information The American Political Science Review (APSR) is the longest running publication of the American Political Science Association (APSA). APSR, first published in November 1906 and appearing quarterly, is the preeminent political science journal in the United States and internationally. APSR features research from all fields of political science and contains an extensive book review section of the discipline. In its earlier days, APSR also covered the personal and personnel items of the profession as had its predecessor, the Proceedings of the APSA. Publisher Information Founded in 1903, the American Political Science Association is the major professional society for individuals engaged in the study of politics and government. APSA brings together political scientists from all fields of inquiry, regions, and occupational endeavors. While most APSA members are scholars who teach and conduct research in colleges and universities in the U.S. and abroad, one-fourth work outside academe in government, research, organizations, consulting firms, the news media, and private enterprise. For more information about the APSA, its publications and programs, please see the APSA website. Rights & Usage This item is part of a JSTOR Collection. How is the president able to influence the federal bureaucracy *?Most directly, the president controls the bureaucracies by appointing the heads of the fifteen cabinet departments and of many independent executive agencies, such as the CIA, the EPA, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These cabinet and agency appointments go through the Senate for confirmation.
What is the president's role in the federal bureaucracy?The President is responsible for implementing and enforcing the laws written by Congress and, to that end, appoints the heads of the federal agencies, including the Cabinet. The Vice President is also part of the Executive Branch, ready to assume the Presidency should the need arise.
What power does the president have over the bureaucracy?The president influences control over the bureaucracy by: appointing agency directors and subheads (with Senate approval) issuing executive orders compelling an agency to do/not do something. increasing or decreasing an agency's budget (through the Office of Management and Budget)
What is one way the president can shape bureaucratic priorities?Presidents can influence the bureaucracy indirectly through the appointment of seven-hundred or so political executives who share their views. Although this process is important and has become increasingly systematic over the past half century, it is also a limited means of control for reasons that are well-documented.
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